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 ‘Fragmentation’, the relocation of processes or functions across countries in response to 
cost and other differences, has important implications for  development.  We discuss  the 
drivers of fragmentation and map it for electronics and automotives in East Asia and Latin 
America.  For technical reasons, e lectronics  is fragmenting  faster  worldwide  than autos. 
Electronics networks are more advanced, widespread and integrated in EA than LAC, and 
are largely responsible for EA’s rapid export growth. The auto network is more advanced in 
LAC but is slower growing and is not integrated into a regional system. Apart from Mexico, 
LAC  lacks  an electronics network, partly accounting  for  the region’s  weak export 
performance. We offer insights into the following: Why do industries fragment differently? 
How can fragmentation be measured? Why does fragmentation  in developing countries 
concentrate on EA and LAC? Why has fragmentation evolved differently in these  two 
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1. Introduction  
Linsu Kim  became  increasingly  interested over time in the international  structure  of 
production in his  research  on technology and industrial  organisation. One of his  last 
publications  (Ernst and Kim, 2002) analysed  technology diffusion and capability 
development  within  ‘global production networks’  (GPNs) in  East Asia.  GPNs are the 
international systems set up to optimise production, marketing and innovation by locating 
products, processes or functions in different countries to benefit from cost, technological, 
marketing, logistic and other differences. Trade theorists call the process ‘fragmentation’ 
(Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001); others call it ‘segmentation’, ‘production sharing’, 
‘integrated production’, ‘outward processing’,  or  ‘vertical specialisation’.
2 Fragmentation 
plays  a growing role in  industrial activity  in some developing countries,  particularly in 
technologically advanced activities. For countries that participate in GPNs, the effects on 
production, employment, exports and technological upgrading have  been  fairly  dramatic 
(UNIDO, 2002).  
This paper maps electronics GPNs in East Asia (EA)
3 and Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC),
4 and compares them to automotive GPNs in both regions, in the process questioning 
the methodology now used to quantify GPNs. We choose these industries since they lead the 
setting of GPNs in complex industries; they are also among the largest and fastest growing 
industries in the developing world.
5  Both  are  scale-intensive  activities  with advanced 
technologies, dominated by oligopolistic firms with strong international presence and global 
brands (though electronics is less concentrated than autos because it covers a much wider 
range of products). Both have processes conducive to fragmentation (see below), but there 
are interesting differences in their  fragmentation patterns.  The auto industry, while more 
mature and longer established  internationally, is  less fragmented than electronics, which, 
despite  rapid technical change  (normally  associated with concentration  in  advanced 
countries), is spreading rapidly in developing countries.  
The spread of GPNs in developing countries is, however, highly uneven: we select EA and 
LAC because they account for the bulk of GPNs in the developing world. However, the two 
regions  have evolved differently and these differences are  interesting. The  EA  electronics 
network is larger, more widespread and better integrated than  LAC’s, providing  the largest 
and fastest growing exports by the former. In LAC, the electronics GPN is largely confined to 
Mexico, which now accounts for some 90% of exports by the region. The automotive GPN, 
                                                 
2 Borrus et al (2000), Ernst (2000), Hobday (2001), Hummels et al (2001), Ng and Yeats (1999) and Sturgeon 
(2002). For an analysis of the causes of fragmentation in East Asia see Yusuf et al (2003). Best (2001) calls the 
fragmentation of functions like R&D horizontal rather than vertical integration.  
3 We focus on ‘EA9’: China, the mature Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan), and the ‘new 
Tigers’ (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). The EA9 account for over 98 percent of electronics and 
automotive exports by developing East Asia.  
4 The LAC section focuses on ‘LAC3’: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico that account for the bulk of regional 
exports in both industries.  
5 Electronics was the fastest growing industry in production during the 1990s globally and in developing 
countries. According to UNIDO data, global value added in ‘electrical machinery’ (of which electronics is a 
major part) rose by 3.5 percent per year during 1990-2000, compared to 1.8 percent for all manufacturing. In the 
developing world, electrical machinery grew by 8.3 percent as compared to 4.4 percent for all manufacturing. In 
terms of size, electrical machinery was the largest industry in terms of value added in both developing countries 
and the world in 2000, up from sixth place in the former and fourth place in the latter in 1980. The transport 
equipment industry (of which automotives is a major component) grew at 2.6 percent in the world and at 6.4 
percent in developing countries in the 1990s. In terms of size, it was the second largest industry in the world 
over 1980-2000, and rose from fifth to third place in the developing world.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 3 
by contrast, is more advanced, widespread and integrated in LAC and is the region’s largest 
manufactured exporter. In EA, auto GPNs are less widespread and integrated.  
GPNs raise many important issues. Why, for instance, do some industries fragment more than 
others? Why  do GPNs  in the developing world concentrate on EA  and  LAC? Why  have 
GPNs evolved differently in these regions? Can other developing regions attract and benefit 
from  fragmentation? We cannot address these questions  fully but we offer some  insights. 
Section 2 provides the analytical  background to  GPNs. Section 3 deals with  problems in 
measuring fragmentation. Section 4  describes the evolution of  global  trade in the  two 
industries. Section 5 deals with the electronics GPN and Section 6 with the auto GPN in EA 
and LAC. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. 'Fragmentation' and GPNs: analytical background 
2.1. What drives fragmentation? 
The drivers of fragmentation are new transport and communication technologies that cut the 
costs of international integration; the facilitators are trade and FDI liberalization (Ernst and 
Kim, 2002, Yusuf, 2003). Economic geographers see it as the manifestation of a ‘global shift’ 
in  industrial  activity (Dicken, 2003).  While  specialisation by process or product, the 
contracting out of particular functions, or the search for cheaper locations overseas, is not 
new, their current geographical reach, dynamism and mode of organisation are. Thus,  
“Recent years have witnessed the emergence of intra-product trade as an 
increasingly important form of intra-industry trade. Needless to say, intra-product 
specialisation can only take place where the various phases of a production process 
are physically separable, that is, where the manufacture of a product is amenable to 
fragmentation. Fragmentation is not a new phenomenon; nor is outsourcing. Both go 
back to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution or even predate it. In the modern 
era, however, both have acquired international dimension and complexity and 
probably represent one of the most  important distinguishing features of 
contemporary globalization” (Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), p. 2).  
Fragmentation,  the ability to  competitively make not  the whole product but  selected 
segments, differs from traditional specialisation. In the  relevant  segments, production 
becomes part of a regional or global operation and reaches enormous scales. While the key 
players in  GPNs are often  multinational companies (MNCs), some GPNs are led by non-
MNCs. In either case, networks generally include independent enterprises in host countries 
linked to  the  lead actors  in  various ways
6. In simpler industries,  with low  technological 
demands, MNCs play a small role in networks relative to buyers, with production mainly in 
the hands of  local firms (Gereffi, 1999). In complex industries, especially rapid technical 
change and valuable proprietary technology, MNCs remain the dominant players.  
                                                 
6 Ties between lead firms and (first-tier) suppliers increasingly extend across national borders, with enterprises 
making location decisions together. This applies particularly to ‘contract manufacturers’ that increasingly 
undertake all production functions for lead firms, leaving them to specialise in high-value research, design and 
marketing activities (Sturgeon and Lester, 2002).  The growth of contract manufacturers is one of the most 
dynamic components of the spread of GPNs (UNCTAD, 2002). Thus, while GPNs offer opportunities to local 
firms to enter globalised systems, they also pose threats to local competitors that cannot globalise as rapidly as 
industry leaders. It also threatens to relegate local suppliers to lower tiers of the value chain if they cannot match 
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The intensity of fragmentation differs by industry, depending on four factors:  
•  The  technical  ‘divisibility’ of  production  processes:  Engineering  activities like 
automobiles or electronics have discrete (separable) stages of production and components 
with differing scale, skill and technological needs whose production can be located in 
different sites and under different ownership. By contrast, continuous process industries 
like chemicals are difficult to break up economically (only service or R&D functions here 
can be dislocated). 
•  The factor intensity of the process: It is only economical to relocate processes if they are 
labour intensive and  reduce costs significantly by shifting to low wage sites.  The 
reduction in production cost must more than offset the rise in transport and coordination 
costs.  
•  The technological complexity of each process:  Not all labour intensive processes (e.g. 
design and development)  can be shifted to  lower wage areas (with low skills and 
capabilities); only simpler and more stable ones can be efficiently relocated.  
•  The value to weight  ratio of the product:  Given the above  conditions, the  scope  for 
fragmentation depends on the weight of the product relative to its value. Light, high value 
products can be shipped long distances to exploit cost differences while heavy, lower 
value ones can only be shipped to proximate areas. 
In electronics all four factors lead to an extensive dispersal of production. It has separable 
processes, some of which are very labour-intensive and, at least to start with, have simple 
skill needs. The  value-to-weight ratio  of components is  high, making  distant locations 
economical.  In autos,  on the other hand,  fragmentation is more constrained.  While  the 
industry  has discrete processes, of which  several  are labour intensive,  most require 
considerable local technological capabilities to be undertaken efficiently. Auto manufacturing 
(beyond simple assembly)  also needs  more  components and services  locally  to be 
competitive. Many (though not all) components are heavy, making their processing suitable 
for relocation in proximate rather than in distant areas. These factors explain the greater and 
faster spread of electronics as compared to auto production in developing countries. 
2.2 GPN location in developing countries  
Political, social  and economic stability,  good infrastructure  (or  efficient  EPZs
7),  suitable 
location for accessing  markets and inputs and efficient bureaucratic procedures are obvious 
pre-conditions. As low cost is the main motive for relocating, wages matter – but wages for 
skilled rather than  ‘raw’ labour:  GPNs generally need high levels of worker, technical and 
managerial capabilities. As facilities mature and grow they need greater local content, calling 
for world-class  local suppliers, service providers and  institutions (training, quality testing, 
certification and the like). Large domestic markets are important factors in GPNs that sell 
products locally or that evolve from import-substituting activity.
8 Location is also influenced 
by fiscal incentives, but these count only when other factors are equal (tax holidays cannot 
substitute for high costs or poor quality in the medium to long term). 
                                                 
7 General trade openness is not a necessary pre-requisite so long as export operations can be insulated. Most 
early GPNs in East Asia were located in EPZs and functioned well as isolated operations in otherwise protected 
economies. In economies like Korea and Taiwan where local firms played a major role, selective protection, 
export subsidies and other industrial policies were used to build local capabilities (Lall, 2001, Westphal, 2002). 
8 Automotive GPNs in LAC3 grew out of import-substitution that fostered metal working, engineering and 
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This explains why GPNs tend to locate in  medium rather than low wage economies.
9 The 
lowest wage economies (as in Africa) generally lack the skills, capabilities, infrastructure, 
institutions  and markets  to support  GPNs,  especially in complex industries.
10  Even in 
countries with industrial capabilities, GPNs avoid those (like India) with cumbersome trade 
and investment procedures, poor infrastructure,  restrictive labour laws,  inefficient EPZs, 
weak institutions and unfavourable policies to technology import.
11 Openness to FDI is not 
always  necessary  to tap GPNs, but access to foreign technology  is: Korea and Taiwan 
restricted FDI but  imported technology in other ways, built strong  local capabilities and 
tapped GPNs by  striking OEM (original equipment manufacture) contracts with lead 
companies (later  establishing  networks of  their own).
12  This  required  complex industrial 
policies and efficient governments to administer them, conditions not met in most other 
industrialising economies (Lall, 2001). Economies like India that failed to build competitive 
capabilities and tap FDI missed the first wave of GPNs. Others with weak local capabilities 
(the ‘new’  Asian Tigers like Malaysia and Thailand)  attracted  GPNs by  favourable FDI 
policies, good infrastructure and macro management, and efficient  EPZs. They  were also 
lucky in that they were located in a region that captured industrial spillovers from Japan and 
the mature Tigers. More recently, the new Tigers are mounting targeted strategies to upgrade 
GPNs and attract new ones. 
GPNs have cumulative advantages for first movers: they create capabilities incrementally and 
can  have  agglomeration effects.
13  When they enter,  GPNs  invest in worker training, 
technology upgrading of suppliers, improving the infrastructure and establishing links with 
institutions. Lead  firms often  induce complementary  investment by  suppliers. Competitors 
and related industries  often  follow successful  leaders, creating industrial clusters.  Scale 
economies in some segments mean that complex networks concentrate in a few sites (Yusuf 
et al, 2003). Even with rising wages, such cumulative benefits make complex GPNs fairly 
rooted, unlike ‘footloose’ low-end garment assembly. GPN growth, in other words, has 
considerable path dependence. 
Cumulativeness, scale economies, externalities and first-mover advantages thus explain why 
GPNs are confined to a small number of countries (and why auto and electronics GPNs focus 
on EA and LAC, see below). Path dependence does not mean, however, that GPNs remain 
rooted in perpetuity – they are, after all, migrating from traditional bases in industrialized 
countries. The  ‘stay-or-move’ decision  depends how fast  wages and other costs rise in 
incumbent locations and their ability to offset this by technological upgrading and increased 
local physical and technological content. ‘Staying’ means that incumbents build the necessary 
capabilities, ‘moving’ that rising costs are not offset by improved capabilities relative to 
                                                 
9 We do not analyse data for Eastern Europe here, but a similar process is under way there, with European 
GPNs setting up facilities in the more advanced countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, with 
smaller facilities in other countries in the Baltic.  
10 Even simple activities like clothing, with lower capability needs, have not moved significantly to Sub-
Saharan Africa. Apparel exports by Africa to the US have grown recently under trade privileges offered by the 
African Growth and Opportunities Act, but the values are tiny and exports may not outlast trade privileges (see 
Lall, 2003).  
11 Indian IT-service exports – organised rather like  GPNs in manufacturing – are booming because none of 
these constraints apply.  
12 On EA strategies to tap GPNs see Hobday (2001), Lall (2001) and Mathews and Cho (1999), and on OEM 
see Cyhn (2001). 
13 On capability building see Kim (1999), Lall (2001), Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka (1995) and Westphal 
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lower cost competitors.
14 Improving local capabilities often needs policy interventions to 
create skills, upgrade capabilities and strengthen  institutions – private actors cannot furnish 
the public goods required or coordinate the actions involved. There are, however, limits to 
such policies: they cannot change the basics of changing comparative advantage; high wage 
countries cannot, for instance, retain simple, labour-intensive processes whatever they do. 
In sum, there are different  ways to tap  fragmentation, with  different policy implications. 
Some can do so at arm’s length but only with advanced local capabilities, unattainable for 
most developing countries. Thus, welcoming FDI regimes
15 are necessary – but they are not 
sufficient. Countries must offer  (apart from  stable macro economies)  good  industrial 
capabilities, efficient trade  procedures, strong institutions  and  competitive  infrastructure. 
Later aspirants must overcome incumbents’ first-mover advantages  with matching 
capabilities. Extracting greater benefits from  and rooting GPNs needs capability deepening. 
All this means that policies matter, but policies constrained by the technological parameters 
of each activity and process. These parameters also mean that many GPNs will not spread 
much further in the developing world: scale and agglomeration economies may keep them 
confined to the lucky few that have entered them. 
3. Mapping fragmentation: methodological issues  
Analysts measure fragmentation by comparing trade in parts and components (P&C) with 
that in  final products (Yeats, 2001, and Ng and Yeats, various).
16 Table 1 shows P&C and 
finished products at the four-digit SITC level
17 for electronics and automotives.
18 In line with 
conventional usage, only items termed ‘parts and accessories’ by SITC are counted as P&C; 
others are treated as finished products.  
                                                 
14 There are also strategic considerations involved: enterprises may be reluctant to locate more than a certain 
share of core segment sourcing in a particular country, even if it is more cost-efficient, to minimise risk of 
disruption in that country.  
15 FDI attraction increasingly involves expert promotion and careful targeting (Lall, 2001). 
16 It would be ideal to complement trade with production data but the latter are not available at the detail 
needed. Hummels et al. (2001) use input-output data to measure ‘vertical specialization’ by calculating the use 
of imported inputs to produce an exported output for 14 (10 OECD and 4 developing) countries. We do not use 
this method partly for lack of data on the countries covered here and partly because the definition of 
fragmentation is too broad: it treats all imported inputs (direct and indirect) as part of fragmentation, whether or 
not the production system is organised as an integrated system.  
17 We use Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2, as do Yeats et al. This classification 
provides the broadest country and time coverage, though the more recent Harmonised System has a more 
detailed breakdown of products 
18 Our classification differs slightly from that of  Ng and Yeats and yields different results. Ng and Yeats 
include  finished telecom products in their category of P&C (SITC 764): the correct item for parts and 
components, however, is SITC 7648, which is much smaller in value, leading them to overestimate the role of 
components trade in total trade and the composition of telecom trade in Asia. Another problem is that they take 
only 7599 to capture parts and components of office machines, when they should also include 7591.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 7 
 
Table 1: Finished products and parts & components in trade in electronics and automotive industries 
Main products  Finished products  Parts and components 
Electronics 
7511  Typewriters, cheque-writing machines 
7512  Calculating machines, cash registers 
Office machines 
 




Parts of and accessories suitable 
for 7511, 751.8 
Parts of and accessories suitable 
for 751.2, 752 
7521  Analogue & hybrid data processing machines 
7522  Complete digital data processing machines 
7523  Complete digital central processing units 
7524 
Digital central storage units, separately 
consigned 





7528  Off-line data processing equipment n. e. s. 
7599  Parts of and accessories suitable 
for 7512, 752 
7611  Television receivers, colour 
7612  Television receivers, monochrome 
7621  Radio-broadcast receivers for motor vehicles 
7622 
Radio-broadcast receivers portable, incl. sound 
rec. 
7628  Other radio-broadcast receivers 
7631  Gramophones & record players, electric 








7648  Telecommunications equipment 
7649  Parts of apparatus of 76 
(including TV, radio, 
gramophones and telecom 
equipment) 
7761  Television picture tubes, cathode ray 
7762  Other electronic valves and tubes 
7763 






7764  Electronic microcircuits 
7768  Piezo-electric crystals, mounted, 
parts of 776 
Automotive 
7810         Passenger motor cars, for transport of 
passengers  
                 & goods 
7841      Chassis fitted with engines for 
motor 
              vehicles 
7821         Motor vehicles for transport of 
goods/materials 
7842      Bodies for the motor vehicles of 
722/ 
               781/ 782/ 783 
7822         Special purpose motor lorries and vans  7849      Other parts & accessories of 
motor 
               vehicles 
7831         Public-service type passenger motor vehicles 
etc.   
 Automobiles 
  
7832         Road tractors and semi-trailers    
Car engines   7132         Internal combustion piston engines for 
propelling 
                  vehicles 
7139       Parts of internal combustion 
piston    engines                          
Source: UN Comtrade.  
Note: The names of the items are taken directly, with some abbreviation, from SITC Rev 2. 
 
However, there are problems in measuring fragmentation this way:  
•  It is difficult to distinguish meaningfully ‘final products’ from ‘parts and components’ by 
using SITC categories. For instance, semiconductors, TV tubes or car engines appear as 
discrete products in the trade data and so are treated as finished products by Yeats et al., 
when they could easily be classified as P&C for electronics or auto products. What SITC QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 8 
labels as ‘parts and accessories’ (and Yeats only counts these as P&C) are a sub-set of all 
the P&C going into final assembly (see point three below).  
•  SITC  data  combine parts and components of different p roducts; f or instance,  in 
electronics they do not separate P&C for office machines from those for ADP equipment.  
•  Many components are not included under the SITC labels for the final products and come 
under different headings. For instance, auto products
19 do not include components like 
automotive electronics and instruments, batteries, tyres, plastics, paints and so on, which 
appear under separate headings. It would be possible track them all if one had the entire 
list of components for each product; however, this is not feasible. Moreover, in any case 
many components serve as  inputs into different products and so would be difficult to 
distinguish. If second-stage inputs (like m etals, plastic or chemicals) were included, the 
problems would multiply.  
•  Trade data do not show different stages of manufacture of a given product (under the 
same SITC heading) in different countries. This is a major gap, since fragmentation often 
involves the same product undergoing different processes in different locations.   
•  Imports  of P&C may be  used  for other  purposes than fragmented production,  e.g. 
domestic-oriented industries or by firms outside integrated systems.  
It  is  thus difficult to capture fragmentation  with  the available data.  Separating  finished 
products  from P&C does give an  indication, but it  is partial and, as seen below, may be 
misleading. Intra-industry trade is another indicator, but it is broad, including differentiated 
products that fall under one heading but are not part of a production network. Trade handled 
by MNCs can provide another indication, but this is difficult to quantify and may  involve 
traditional  trade by MNCs  not  involving fragmentation.  The broadest measure is  total 
exports: where it is expected that  a country is unlikely to export outside GPNs (a 
technologically  backward country in a high technology  activity), exports can indicate 
fragmentation.  Again, this is very broad  – an ‘outside envelope’ indicator.  Given these 
inherent problems, we use a mixture of measures below.  
4. Global trends in electronics and automotive fragmentation  
4.1 Export performance  
In 1990, world auto exports ($320.6 billion) were 22 percent larger than electronics ($261.6 
billion). Over the decade, auto exports grew by 5.9% p.a. and electronics exports by 11.7%; 
by 2000 electronics exports ($788.9 billion) were 38% larger than auto exports ($570.4 
billion).
  20 The share of electronics in total exports rose from 8.7 to 13.8 percent over the 
decade, while that of auto products fell from 10.6 to 10.0 percent (total exports grew at 
6.6%). Table 2 shows the values, growth rates and market shares of exports by developed and 
developing countries, and by EA and LAC separately, for the main product categories. Note 
                                                 
19 In the SITC Rev 2 classification, automotive products appear explicitly under item 78 (road vehicles) and 
713 (internal combustion piston engines and parts). Of the former, 781 is passenger motor cars, 782 motor 
vehicles for transporting goods, 783 other motor vehicles and 784 parts and components (chassis fitted with 
engines, bodies for motor vehicles and ‘other parts and accessories’). Under 713 come engines for aircraft, 
marine propulsion and motor vehicles, as well as parts of all these (combined).  
20 We use data for 1990 to 2000 although data are available for 2001 because there was a trade recession in 
2000-2001, with electronics exports declining by 15.4 percent and auto exports by 0.5 percent. Since this is 
likely to be a temporary dip, we use 2000 data to capture structural trends.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 9 
that EA here includes all 26 countries in the East and Southeast Asian region and LAC 
includes all 40 economies in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
 
Table 2: Electronics and automotive exports (1990 to 2000) 
   Value (US$ billion)  World Market Share  Growth Rate 
Main Products     1990  2000  1990  2000  1990 - 2000 
Electronics 
 World   18.2  23.8  100.0%  100.0%  2.7% 
Developed  14.7  17.8  80.5%  74.7%  1.9% 
Developing  3.4  5.9  18.8%  24.9%  5.7% 
EA  3.2  5.4  17.6%  22.5%  5.3% 
Office machines 
LAC  0.2  0.5  1.0%  2.2%  11.0% 
 World   107.9  328.3  100.0%  100.0%  11.8% 
Developed  85.8  175.4  79.5%  53.4%  7.4% 
Developing  20.9  148.0  19.4%  45.1%  21.6% 
EA  20.1  134.1  18.7%  40.8%  20.9% 
Automatic data processing 
(ADP) machines 
LAC  0.7  13.4  0.6%  4.1%  34.9% 
 World   76.7  152.4  100.0%  100.0%  7.1% 
Developed  50.9  88.2  66.4%  57.8%  5.6% 
Developing  23.8  60.0  31.1%  39.3%  9.7% 
EA  23.0  46.2  30.0%  30.3%  7.2% 
Television, radio-broadcast 
receivers, gramophones and 
telecom equipment 
LAC  0.5  12.6  0.6%  8.3%  39.5% 
 World   58.8  284.5  100.0%  100.0%  17.1% 
Developed  40.1  146.7  68.2%  51.6%  13.9% 
Developing  18.5  136.4  31.4%  48.0%  22.1% 
EA  17.8  130.9  30.2%  46.0%  22.1% 
Thermionic, cold & photo 
cathode valves 
(semiconductors) 
LAC  0.1  3.4  0.2%  1.2%  38.5% 
 World   261.6  788.9  100.0%  100.0%  11.7% 
Developed  191.5  428.0  73.2%  54.3%  8.4% 
Developing  66.7  350.3  25.5%  44.4%  18.0% 
EA  64.1  316.5  24.5%  40.1%  17.3% 
Total electronics 
LAC  1.4  30.0  0.6%  3.8%  35.5% 
Automotive 
 World   290.9  512.4  100.0%  100.0%  5.8% 
Developed  259.4  438.0  89.2%  85.5%  5.4% 
Developing  12.5  60.9  4.3%  11.9%  17.2% 
EA  6.9  21.9  2.4%  4.3%  12.2% 
Automobiles 
LAC  4.9  34.4  1.7%  6.7%  21.5% 
Car Engines   World   29.7  58.0  100.0%  100.0%  6.9% QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 10 
Developed  26.8  47.1  90.0%  81.3%  5.8% 
Developing  2.7  6.5  9.1%  11.2%  9.2% 
EA  0.3  1.2  1.1%  2.1%  14.0% 
 
LAC  2.3  4.8  7.6%  8.3%  7.9% 
 World   320.6  570.4  100.0%  100.0%  5.9% 
Developed  286.2  485.2  89.3%  85.1%  5.4% 
Developing  15.2  67.5  4.7%  11.8%  16.1% 
EA  7.2  23.1  2.3%  4.1%  12.3% 
Total automotive 
LAC  7.2  39.2  2.2%  6.9%  18.5% 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database. 
Note: Exports by developed and developing countries do not add up to  world exports because the latter include exports by 
transition economies, not shown separately. EA includes all 26 developing countries in East and Southeast Asia and LAC 
includes all 40 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
 
Developing country exports outpace the world in both industries, with electronics growing 
faster than autos. Developing countries raise their market share f rom 4.7 to 11.8 percent in 
automotive products and 25.5 to 44.4 percent in electronics.
21 Their dynamism is, however, 
due primarily  to East Asia, which accounts for 90 percent of the developing world total in 
2000. The decline in  its share from 96 percent in 1990 is due to LAC’s rise (from 2 to 9 
percent); other regions provide only 1-2% of developing world electronics exports in both 
years.  
In autos, complete automobiles account for the bulk of exports. Though engines grow faster, 
they comprise only 10.2 percent of auto exports in 2000 (9.3% in 1990). While EA and LAC 
exported similar values in 1990, the latter grew more rapidly and by 2000 exported nearly 
70% more. Again, other developing regions were  marginal, accounting for 5.2% of total 
developing world auto exports in 1990 and 7.7% in 2000 (LAC accounted for 58% by 2000).  
These  data  cannot  distinguish  ‘fragmented’ from other  exports but  provide  a  useful 
‘envelope’ indicator of electronics and auto GPNs. We know that MNC production networks 
account for the bulk of production and exports in both industries,
22 and  it is likely that a 
significant portion of trade is fragmented. If this is so, the figures suggest that: 
•  The electronics industry globally is fragmenting more rapidly than automotives, though it 
is difficult to separate the effect of fragmentation from innovation and income elasticity 
of demand.  
•  In the developing world, fragmentation is also more rapid in electronics than in autos.
23 
The most complex electronics products (ADP machines and semiconductors) have very 
high shares of developing country exports, suggesting that these high value products have 
fragmented most.  
                                                 
21 Electronics provided 11.5 percent of the developing world’s total manufactured exports in 1990 and 24.5 
percent in 2000, and autos 2.5 and 4.3 percent, respectively.  
22 On autos, see Humphrey and Memedovic (2003) and Veloso (2000); on electronics see Ernst (2000) and 
Hobday (2001). Also see UNCTAD (2000 and 2003).    
23 This is an oversimplification for EA, where MNCs from Korea and Taiwan compete head-on with MNCs 
from industrialized countries.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 11 
•  GPNs are highly concentrated within the developing world – electronics in EA and autos 
in LAC. Other developing regions are conspicuously absent. 
4.2 Exports of finished products vs. parts and components (P&C) 
Annex Tables 1 and 2 show exports  by  electronics and autos  broken down by  finished 
products and P&C, for developed and developing countries and EA and LAC.  
Electronics: The value of finished product exports worldwide was over double that of P&C in 
2000, with similar distributions in industrial and developing countries. Global P&C exports 
grew slightly faster (12.3%) than finished products (11.4%), the pattern varying by category 
(Figure 1). There was a relatively small lead in the growth rate for P&C over finished 
products for ADP equipment and a large one for TV, audio and telecom equipment. By this 
measure, therefore, the latter segment was the one fragmenting the most. However, the 
semiconductor segment, which was growing faster and with a larger share for developing 
countries, saw more rapid growth in finished products than in P&C.  
In the developing world, exports of P&C also grew faster than finished products (19.8% and 
17.4%), but the reverse was true of office machines and semiconductors. By region, LAC 
generally had higher rates of growth than EA in almost all categories in both finished 
products and P&C, but it started from a much smaller base. Both regions had faster growth in 
P&C than in finished products, but in EA finished products grew faster than P&C for office 
machines and semiconductors. In LAC, finished products grew faster than P&C only for 
semiconductors.  
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Automotives: Finished product exports were much larger than P&C but the pattern of growth 
was reverse of electronics – world P&C exports grew slower than finished products (5.7% 
and 6.1%, respectively) overall and in both sub-categories (Figure 1).  In developing 
countries, P&C exports for engines grew faster than finished products, and by 2000 the value 
of the former exceeded the latter (though the values are relatively small). This suggests rapid 
fragmentation of engine production in the developing world but less so for automobiles.  
As noted, however, this fragmentation measure is questionable, since it excludes processing 
of given products. While the P&C data confirm that electronics is fragmenting faster than 
automobiles, at the sub-category level they give misleading results. Semiconductors seem to 
be fragmenting slowly, when t he  rapid growth of finished  semiconductor exports by QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 12 
developing countries suggests that there is rapid fragmentation within the category. Evidently 
the P&C measure  misses  the full  dimensions  of fragmentation.  For this reason, we  use 
broader trade data below to map fragmentation. 
5. Electronics fragmentation in EA and LAC  
Electronics drove EA export success in 1990-2000, raising  its share in total exports  from 
17.8% to 31.7% and growing significantly faster (17.3% p.a.) than total exports (10.7%). In 
LAC, electronics played a much smaller role, accounting  for 1.2% of total exports in 1990 
and 8.7% in 2000. While LAC electronics exports  grew  much faster (35.5%) than  EA’s, 
LAC’s base was tiny and over the 1990s its market share gain, 3 points, was much smaller 
than  EA’s 15 points. LAC exports were also  more concentrated, with Mexico providing 
nearly 90% by 2000; EA exports were more dispersed, the leader (Singapore) accounting for 
23.7% and the top four for 72.5%.
 24  
Figure 2: Annual growth rates and world market share changes for electronic exports by main  LAC 







-1% 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15% 17%








































LAC 3, exc. Mexico (1.4)
Singapore (71.0)
World annual growth rate for electronic exports (1990-2000)
China (36.7)
 
Figure 2 shows export growth rates and world market share changes for the main exporters in 
EA and LAC, export values in 2000, and the world export growth rate. It shows the striking 
lead of EA over LAC (the dark bubbles show regional totals). All the Asian countries in the 
figure grow faster than the world average, gaining market share. Brazil and Argentina (LAC3 
without Mexico) lose market share, appearing as a tiny bubble on the bottom left.  
To analyse regional GPNs, we examine electronics exports and imports by destination and 
origin. Annex Table 3 shows EA9 and Annex Table 4 LAC (LAC3 plus Costa Rica
25). Table 
3 below shows exports and imports for each country by destination and origin and the trade 
balance. 
                                                 
24 UN trade data show Singapore to be the largest electronics exporter in EA in 2000. However, this includes 
re-exports, which, according to Singapore data, account for about 40 percent of total merchandise exports. If we 
adjust its electronics exports by 40%, its ‘own’ exports come to $43 billion. This makes Singapore the fourth 
largest exporter in EA, after Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia. In 2001 China overtook all these countries to become 
the largest electronics exporter in East Asia (and the developing world). The only ‘loser’ in the region was Hong 
Kong, with electronics exports declining by 1.4% per annum. 
25 Costa Rica is a recent entrant to electronics, a consequence of winning, after highly targeted effort, the first 
Intel plant in LAC (Spar, 1998). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 13 
Table 3: Distribution of exports and imports by destination and origin (%) and trade balance (US$ billion) for 
electronic products 
EA9  Japan  ROW  World 
      1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Export destination  27.0%  38.3%  7.2%  11.5%  65.8%  50.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  38.0%  50.5%  33.4%  20.2%  28.5%  29.3%  100.0%  100.0%  EA9 
Trade balance ($ b.)  -2.6  -14.2  -12.8  -17.5  27.3  80.6  12.0  48.9 
Export destination  87.2%  36.6%  1.3%  12.5%  11.5%  50.9%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  11.9%  62.0%  4.6%  30.2%  83.5%  7.8%  100.0%  100.0%  China  
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.4  -4.9  -0.8  -4.3  -14.7  16.4  -15.1  7.2 
Export destination  21.1%  42.2%  4.3%  7.0%  74.6%  50.8%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  45.3%  57.2%  28.6%  17.3%  26.1%  25.5%  100.0%  100.0%  Singapore 
Trade balance ($ b.)  -1.8  0.2  -2.8  -4.0  10.5  22.8  5.9  18.9 
Export destination  41.8%  49.7%  3.3%  5.6%  54.9%  44.7%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  54.1%  67.4%  29.2%  16.4%  16.8%  16.2%  100.0%  100.0%  Hong Kong 
Trade balance ($ b.)  -4.2  -32.8  -3.2  -8.2  0.6  -6.6  -6.8  -47.6 
Export destination  18.4%  33.5%  6.3%  15.0%  75.3%  51.5%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  34.0%  43.5%  29.6%  21.9%  36.4%  34.6%  100.0%  100.0%  Taiwan 
Trade balance ($ b.)  1.3  12.8  -0.1  5.4  8.6  23.9  9.8  42.0 
Export destination  17.8%  35.7%  14.0%  12.3%  68.2%  52.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  15.0%  38.9%  50.2%  22.7%  34.9%  38.4%  100.0%  100.0%  Korea 
Trade balance ($ b.)  1.3  6.4  -1.9  -0.7  6.5  15.0  5.8  20.7 
Export destination  35.7%  39.4%  8.3%  11.5%  56.0%  49.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  31.6%  42.0%  25.0%  19.3%  43.3%  38.7%  100.0%  100.0%  Malaysia 
Trade balance ($ b.)  1.0  5.9  -0.7  -0.5  2.0  11.7  2.3  17.0 
Export destination  36.3%  42.3%  8.1%  14.5%  55.6%  43.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  32.7%  50.1%  21.5%  13.9%  45.7%  36.0%  100.0%  100.0%  Indonesia 
Trade balance ($ b.)  -0.2  2.7  -0.1  0.9  -0.3  2.8  -0.6  6.4 
Export destination  34.4%  40.2%  7.9%  12.6%  57.7%  47.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  34.0%  43.5%  29.6%  21.9%  36.4%  34.6%  100.0%  100.0%  Thailand 
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.1  1.4  -0.7  -0.7  0.7  3.8  0.1  4.5 
Export destination  28.5%  39.1%  8.6%  12.8%  63.0%  48.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  21.9%  33.9%  27.7%  22.4%  50.4%  43.8%  100.0%  100.0%  Philippines 
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.0  5.7  -0.2  0.6  -0.1  6.8  -0.3  13.1 
  LAC3  USA  ROW  World 
      1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Export destination  7.4%  1.7%  52.8%  89.6%  39.8%  8.6%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  2.2%  1.6%  52.0%  64.4%  45.8%  34.0%  100.0%  100.0%  LAC3 
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.0  -0.1  -1.3  3.2  -1.3  -9.2  -2.5  -6.0 
Argentina  Export destination  13.2%  17.8%  5.9%  45.5%  80.8%  36.7%  100.0%  100.0% QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 14 
Import origin  10.0%  19.9%  28.6%  25.7%  61.4%  54.4%  100.0%  100.0%   
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.0  -0.4  -0.1  -0.5  -0.1  -1.1  -0.2  -2.0 
Export destination  7.7%  29.1%  48.1%  35.7%  44.2%  35.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  2.1%  1.7%  40.0%  40.9%  57.9%  57.3%  100.0%  100.0%  Brazil 
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.0  0.3  -0.3  -2.2  -0.5  -3.3  -0.8  -5.2 
Export destination  5.9%  0.3%  66.2%  92.4%  27.8%  7.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  1.2%  0.1%  62.7%  73.5%  36.1%  26.4%  100.0%  100.0%  Mexico 
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.0  0.1  -1.0  6.0  -0.6  -4.8  -1.6  1.2 
Export destination  0.0%  0.9%  31.5%  54.9%  68.5%  44.2%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  2.5%  1.9%  66.0%  89.7%  31.4%  8.4%  100.0%  100.0%  Costa Rica 
Trade balance ($ b.)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.8 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade. ROW stands for ‘rest of the world’. 
The data for EA9 suggest: 
•  For EA9 as a whole, intra-regional exports grew much faster than exports to ROW, and 
by 2000 comprised 38% of total electronics exports (50% including Japan). Intra-regional 
imports grew even  faster, and outpaced imports from  ROW (EA9 providing over 50% 
and Japan another 20%). The regional trade balance consequently grew more negative 
over time, the deficit within EA9 growing faster than with Japan. The trade balance with 
ROW, on the other hand, was increasingly positive (the main partner being USA). This 
significant increase in intra-regional trade had a large ‘fragmented’ component: the region 
was being knit into a tight production network, partly to meet burgeoning regional needs 
but mainly to serve ROW.
 26  
•  China evolved differently from other countries, being the only one whose share of exports 
to EA9  fell  (by 51 percentage points); like others,  its imports from  EA9 rose but the 
extent of the rise was startling (50 points). The share of Japan in exports rose but imports 
from Japan rose much more. Taking EA9 and Japan together, the regional share of 
Chinese exports fell by 39 points and its share of imports rose by 76 points. ROW took 
51% of its exports and provided only 8% of its imports: China was acting as a base for 
neighbours to process exports to other regions.
27   
•  Of the mature Tigers (Hong Kong aside), Singapore was most oriented to EA9 and least 
to Japan, in line with its emerging role as a regional hub for MNC operations in East 
Asia. Korea and Taiwan ran large surpluses within EA9; Taiwan also had a significant 
surplus with Japan.  
                                                 
26 Most electronics trade in EA is handled by MNCs, but some major MNCs are regional (from Korea and 
Taiwan) and use the same fragmentation strategies as other MNCs. In the rest of EA9, most electronics exports 
are managed by foreign MNCs; this is also true of China, despite the growth of some large national electronics 
firms. In 2000, according to UNCTAD (2002), 91% of Chinese semiconductor exports, 85% of ADP exports 
and 96% of mobile telephone exports came from MNCs.  
27 Within EA9, the bulk of China’s electronics imports are from Korea and Taiwan. China runs a huge surplus 
with Hong Kong; if this is excluded, its deficit with the rest of EA9 rises to $11.7 billion, of which nearly $7 
billion is with Korea and Taiwan. The ‘new Tigers’ account for a Chinese trade deficit of around $3 billion; 
most of this is with Malaysia and Thailand, which have much more advanced electronics industries than 
Indonesia and Philippines (Lall and Albaladejo, 2003).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 15 
•  Of the new Tigers, EA9 assumed greater importance as both a destination for exports and 
a source of imports (Philippines was the least oriented to EA9). Japan was a major trading 
partner for all countries, particularly as a source of imports, but not as significant as EA9.  
Thus, a tight network is emerging in EA9, with Japan playing an important but not dominant 
role and Chinese entry strengthening regional competitiveness.
28 MNCs (local and other) are 
fitting  locations into complex specialisation patterns that allow each to retain facilities and 
expand exports, though the trade data cannot show how specialisation patterns are changing. 
There is still competition for exports and high-value functions between the locations, but so 
far GPNs have helped relatively high-wage incumbents like Singapore (even Malaysia) retain 
export competitiveness.  
LAC patterns are very different. Mexico succeeds because of NAFTA trade privileges rather 
than  (in contrast to  EA)  sheer efficiency,  and consequently remains vulnerable.
29  Other 
players are small or marginal. Regional trade patterns show that: 
•  Mexico exports primarily to the US, which provides nearly three-quarters of its imports: 
this is the main electronics network.  Mexico also imports significantly  from ROW 
(mainly from Asia, with Japanese and Korean firms dominating the consumer electronics 
segments
30) to feed exports to the US, but practically nothing from LAC3.  
•  Costa Rica has a small GPN, primarily the Intel plant that uses US imports to export to 
the US and ROW.  
The main electronics GPN in LAC is a constricted North American network delinked from 
the rest of the region, with no signs of the intra-regional links that characterise EA9. The 
specialisation pattern is far simpler (Mexico does low-level assembly with low local physical 
and technological content) and local capabilities and enterprises far weaker.  
Given LAC’s long history of industrialization and location advantages vis a vis the US (the 
main  electronics export  market), the question is why it lags so badly in the world’s  most 
dynamic export industry. While we cannot explore them  in depth, the reasons  may  be as 
follows. When  electronics GPNs entered developing countries in the late 1960s, LAC was 
richer (and so higher wage) than EA. Its trade regime was protectionist and inward-looking 
and m any countries  had  restrictive  FDI  regimes.  LAC industrial  policies lacked the 
selectivity and effectiveness of  Korea  or  Taiwan,  which used FDI  restrictions,  credit 
allocation and  infant industry protection combined with  strong export incentives to build 
world-class local capabilities. Attempts to develop local electronics industries (as in Brazil) 
failed. Import substituting policies were not offset by efficient EPZs (these came later, mainly 
in Central America), nor were high wages offset by skill or capability advantages over EA. In 
                                                 
28 Lall and Albaladejo (2003) show that in electronics China is complementing rather than taking market share 
from its neighbours (though particular firms may suffer as activities move to China). There is nevertheless a 
significant potential threat to Malaysian electronics exports, as in the segments in which it specialises China is 
gaining share more rapidly. In textiles and clothing, by contrast, China poses a direct threat, taking market share 
from its neighbours.   
29 Maquila provisions have existed for decades but did not allow Mexico to compete with EA: only NAFTA’s 
additional privileges stimulated Mexican exports (Dussel Peters, 2000). There has, however, recently been 
significant relocation of electronics from Mexican maquiladoras to China, reflecting lower wages and higher 
productivity in the latter, and low local content in Mexico (much lower than in East Asia, according to 
UNCTAD, 2000, and Dussel Peters, 2000). According to The International Herald Tribune (2003), some 500 of 
3,700 plants in the Mexican maquilas, mainly in electronics and apparel, shifted to China, with 218,000 job 
losses. 
30 Some Asian consumer electronics firms bring in components into Mexico via the US; this shows up as US 
inputs in the trade data. We are grateful to Michael Mortimore for this insight.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 16 
the early years LAC suffered bouts of macro and political instability that deterred export-
oriented FDI. At the start, therefore, LAC could not use its location and historic links to 
attract US GPNs. 
As LAC macro and political conditions improved and economies were liberalised, the speed 
and unselective nature of liberalization damaged rather than strengthened  industrial 
capabilities.
31 In the 1990s LAC did receive large amounts of FDI – more per capita than EA 
– but this did not go into high technology GPNs, suggesting that its structural handicaps (low 
capabilities, high costs and so on) persisted. Moreover, EA established first-mover capability, 
agglomeration and network advantages, also pulling further ahead in skill development and 
technological effort. LAC’s penchant for non-selectivity meant that it could not target FDI in 
ways that led Singapore, and later Malaysia, to tap electronics GPNs effectively (Costa Rica 
is the exception that proves the rule).  
Mexico broke the mould in the late 1990s through NAFTA privileges that overcame regional 
handicaps. However, its competitive base is shallow relative to EA and remains vulnerable to 
Chinese competition;  the  lack of regional networks  is  another weakness. China’s rise in 
electronics shows that first mover advantages are not inviolable but this may not hold many 
lessons for LAC:  few  other countries can match Chinese advantages in  low-cost and 
productive labour,  stock  of technical skills, good EPZ  infrastructure,  gigantic domestic 
market, capable local suppliers and targeted policies to raise capabilities. Moreover, China’s 
participation in a complex regional network strengthens its location advantages. For LAC to 
overcome these advantages would demand policy interventions of a complexity and intensity 
that seem impossible today. 
6. Auto fragmentation in EA and LAC  
In the 1990s, the auto industry shifted significant  facilities  from developed to developing 
countries. While the industry had  many  operations  in  developing countries, most served 
protected domestic markets and were uncompetitive. With liberalization, there was a move to 
create cost-efficient plants aimed at global markets. Many inefficient operations were wound 
down; a few were  upgraded as  regional or global platforms after  massively restructuring 
plants and supply chains. The process went furthest in LAC3 under the aegis of developed 
country MNCs (Mortimore, 1998, 2000, 2004).  EA followed a different pattern: Western 
MNCs played a small role – Japan dominated, with a growing role of some domestic players 
(particularly  in Korea, but also in Malaysia) – but the region was not knit into a coherent 
network. Auto exports accounted for 2.8% of total exports in EA in 1990 and 3.1% in 2000; 
for LAC the figures are 6.1% and 11.7%. 
LAC and EA together accounted for 92.3% (58.1% and 34.2% respectively) of developing 
world auto exports in 2000, gaining 4.5 and 1.8 points of world market share since 1990. 
Figure 3 shows the performance of the main  exporters  in  these regions (the dark bubbles 
showing regional  totals).  Mexico is by far the largest player, accounting for 45.6% of 
developing world, and 89.5% of LAC, auto exports. Korea is next, with 22.4% of developing 
world and 65.4% of EA exports. Then come Brazil (7.9% of developing world exports), 
Thailand (3.4%) and Taiwan (0.3%). China is relatively small, and, in contrast to its record in 
other industries, does badly in the 1990s.  Argentina and Singapore are even smaller, the 
former gaining market share and the latter losing.
32 Annex Tables 5 and 6 show country 
values and geographical distributions of exports and imports for EA9 and LAC3.  
                                                 
31 For a comparison of export competitiveness in LAC and EA see Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira (2004).  
32 Note that Malaysia, while well-known for its national auto industry, remains marginal as an exporter.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 17 
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 Table 4 shows distribution of exports and imports and trade balance for EA and LAC in 
autos.  
Table 4: Distribution of exports and imports by destination and origin (%) and trade balance (US$ 
billion) for automotive products 
    EA9  Japan  ROW  World 
      1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Export destination  49.6%  12.3%  4.3%  4.3%  46.1%  83.4%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  17.9%  9.5%  50.4%  52.5%  31.7%  38.0%  100.0%  100.0%  EA9 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.5  0.8  -8.2  -10.2  -2.0  11.1  -9.7  1.7 
Export destination  86.8%  12.9%  4.4%  15.1%  8.7%  72.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  10.5%  7.0%  32.1%  39.8%  57.4%  53.2%  100.0%  100.0%  China  
Trade Balance ($ b.)  2.8  -0.1  -0.5  -1.4  -0.8  -1.0  1.6  -2.5 
Export destination  57.3%  61.0%  2.8%  3.9%  39.9%  35.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  5.0%  9.6%  45.8%  48.2%  49.2%  42.2%  100.0%  100.0%  Singapore 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.2  0.2  -0.7  -1.3  -0.6  -0.9  -1.2  -1.9 
Export destination  1.6%  2.4%  10.7%  41.3%  87.7%  56.3%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  8.2%  11.0%  57.2%  44.2%  34.5%  44.8%  100.0%  100.0%  Hong Kong 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  -0.1  -0.3  -0.6  -1.1  -0.3  -1.1  -1.0  -2.4 
Export destination  9.9%  24.7%  8.5%  8.6%  81.6%  66.7%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  2.9%  7.3%  36.6%  53.4%  60.5%  39.2%  100.0%  100.0%  Taiwan 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.0  0.3  -0.9  -1.3  -1.0  0.2  -1.8  -0.9 
Export destination  6.1%  5.8%  2.5%  1.2%  91.4%  93.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  0.3%  3.2%  58.6%  42.0%  41.0%  54.7%  100.0%  100.0%  Korea 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.1  0.8  -0.6  -0.6  1.6  13.1  1.2  13.2 
Export destination  21.4%  42.4%  2.2%  5.4%  76.5%  52.3%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  1.6%  7.7%  76.4%  75.1%  22.0%  17.2%  100.0%  100.0%  Malaysia 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.0  0.0  -1.0  -1.4  -0.2  -0.2  -1.2  -1.6 
Export destination  83.2%  51.5%  6.5%  20.0%  10.4%  28.6%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  2.6%  17.4%  78.9%  60.2%  18.5%  22.4%  100.0%  100.0%  Indonesia 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.0  -0.2  -1.2  -1.1  -0.3  -0.4  -1.5  -1.7 
Thailand  Export destination  26.5%  13.2%  7.9%  7.6%  65.6%  79.2%  100.0%  100.0% QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 18 
Import origin  1.3%  8.4%  84.9%  71.9%  13.9%  19.7%  100.0%  100.0%   
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.0  0.1  -2.3  -1.5  -0.3  1.4  -2.6  0.0 
Export destination  53.0%  33.4%  31.6%  18.9%  15.5%  47.7%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  6.8%  26.7%  81.5%  60.4%  11.7%  12.9%  100.0%  100.0%  Philippines 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.0  -0.1  -0.4  -0.5  -0.1  0.1  -0.5  -0.4 
    LAC3  USA  ROW  World 
      1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Export destination  4.8%  10.6%  69.5%  74.2%  25.8%  15.3%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  5.1%  12.9%  60.4%  58.3%  34.5%  28.8%  100.0%  100.0%  LAC3 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.1  0.2  2.2  11.1  0.3  -2.7  2.6  8.5 
Export destination  35.2%  55.5%  12.0%  6.1%  52.8%  38.4%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  34.5%  47.3%  10.9%  6.6%  54.6%  46.1%  100.0%  100.0%  Argentina 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.0  -0.8  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -0.9  0.0  -1.8 
Export destination  10.5%  41.0%  35.5%  20.0%  54.0%  39.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  12.5%  37.1%  19.1%  9.0%  68.4%  53.9%  100.0%  100.0%  Brazil 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  0.2  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.9  -0.4  1.7  0.8 
Export destination  0.1%  0.4%  90.5%  88.5%  9.4%  11.1%  100.0%  100.0% 
Import origin  32.6%  30.6%  34.5%  37.3%  32.9%  32.2%  100.0%  100.0%  Mexico 
Trade Balance ($ b.)  -2.4  -13.7  1.5  10.6  -2.0  -11.1  -3.0  -14.2 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade. ROW stands for ‘rest of the world’. In LAC, ROW includes Canada.  
The table suggests a weak regional network in EA. The share of EA9 in its own exports and 
imports is low and is declining over time. Japan has a minor role in exports but a dominant 
one in imports: Japanese MNCs  clearly  use EA9 to assemble  Japanese  components for 
domestic markets and for exports to ROW. Korea, the leading exporter, sells mainly to ROW, 
using significant Japanese imports. Thailand, the next largest, is similar but depends far more 
on Japanese imports. Philippines is the only country that trades significantly within EA9, but 
it is a small player.  
The data suggest three networks in LAC: Mexico with the US, within LAC3, and LAC3 with 
ROW. The first clearly dominates, with Mexico’s enormous volume of exports to the US. 
While Mexico also imports about equally from the US, Brazil & Argentina, and ROW, a 
significant part of Mexican auto ROW imports are parts and components from Canada (an 
integral part of US auto GPNs), and  most imports from  LAC3 are finished autos (small 
models of Ford and VW)  from Brazil.
33  Thus, Mexico is effectively integrating into the 
North American system but not with that in Brazil and Argentina. The latter two countries 
trade  increasingly  with  each other;  Argentina  trades little with  USA and  Brazil more 
(particularly in exporting finished autos) but the US role is declining. ROW is significant for 
both, with significant trade with Europe, but is losing share.  
What explains  LAC’s lead  over EA  in auto  GPNs?  Both  regions started  with  import 
substitution (though EA9 developed stronger indigenous enterprises); their evolution differed 
mainly when they liberalised and globalised. In EA9 the dominant foreign player, Japan, did 
not build regional networks to serve its home market but used production bases to export to 
other destinations. US auto majors, unlike counterparts in electronics, did not invest in EA to 
serve their home market (products were too heavy). Attempts to build regional systems (e.g. 
ASEAN) largely failed. Korea became a significant auto exporter and invested in the region, 
but not to develop integrated production systems. Only Thailand (called the ‘Detroit of the 
                                                 
33 We are grateful to Michael Mortimore for this information.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 19 
East’) is becoming a large production base for global MNCs and is now the second largest 
exporter from EA9. However, this history does not mean that auto GPNs will not grow in 
EA9; with freer regional trade, upgrading and expansion of China’s auto industry and rapid 
demand growth in the region, integrated production is likely to increase. Korea, China and 
Thailand may be the hub of future GPNs (Japanese MNCs remaining major players), with 
other countries  contributing (in particular Taiwan as a major supplier of complex 
components).  
Auto MNCs restructured operations in LAC3 countries differently in response to different 
competitive pressures. In Mexico, US majors GM and Ford acted mainly to meet Japanese 
competition  in the US market  (Mortimore, 1998, 2000), while in  Brazil and Argentina, 
European MNCs (VW and Fiat), with US MNCs following, responded largely to preserve 
markets in South America. Trade policies, with special provisions for autos, were important 
in fostering integration: Mercosur for Brazil with  Argentina, and NAFTA for Mexico with 
US. Other integration evolved naturally, but the Mexico-US network dominates because of 
the size and needs of the US.   
Auto GPNs in LAC seem secure from direct EA competition for logistical (value-to-weight) 
reasons. However, EA auto exports may well grow more rapidly in the future, given the pace 
of growth of its main market within the region, with faster  formation of GPNs as trade 
liberalises.  
7. Conclusions  
Fragmentation is an important feature of the world economy and, in its present form, has 
important development implications, at least for the countries that can participate in it. It is, 
however, difficult to measure, and far more research is needed to capture is true nature and 
dimensions. The two industries here spearhead fragmented production in complex industries 
in developing countries, but their evolution shows interesting differences.  
The electronics industry is fragmenting faster than autos, largely for technical reasons: high 
value-to-weight ratios and lower capability needs for ‘fragmentable’ processes. While export 
growth in electronics is also due to faster innovation and demand growth, fragmentation (as 
shown by the share of developing world exports) has been a major factor. Given the size and 
dynamism of electronics markets, countries entering GPNs have transformed their export and 
industrial structures.  There are few signs of electronics growth slowing down (though 
technical trends are inherently unpredictable). The auto industry, a more mature industry, is 
growing more slowly though it may prove a  large and dynamic export product for some 
countries.  
Fragmentation in the developing world concentrates in  EA and  LAC for several  reasons, 
including location,  wages,  skills,  trade and FDI policies and infrastructure.  However, 
industrial policies and serendipity have also played important roles. EA did much better than 
LAC in the more dynamic electronics industry, even to serve US markets, partly because of 
strategies to build  local capabilities, partly because of  targeted FDI strategies and partly 
because the ‘new Tigers’ were in the right place at the right time (offering efficient export 
processing sites when GPNs started). EA then  developed  strong  first-mover  advantages, 
strengthening them as GPNs became regional. China’s massive recent expansion shows that 
newcomers can still enter – but only if they offer the constellation of advantages it provides 
and if they fit into existing networks. Mexico’s growth is entirely due to NAFTA privileges 
and is already proving vulnerable; its success will last only if it can raise local content and 
sophistication rapidly enough to offset wage and productivity disadvantages vis a vis China.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 20 
In the auto industry, GPNs are more advanced in LAC because of logistic factors (the weight 
of the product) and  trade agreements (paradoxically,  with  Asian competition forcing  the 
search for cheaper locations). NAFTA again dominates but in this case its benefits are more 
lasting because EA cannot pose a direct threat. In EA, regional networks have not formed but 
may emerge in the medium term as trade liberalises. LAC’s lead in auto fragmentation does 
not hold the promise for rapid export growth in the way that the East Asian lead in electronics 
does.  
What of other developing regions, presently marginal to complex GPNs? Liberalization, skill 
formation, infrastructure improvement and competitive pressures on MNCs should lead to the 
spread of  GPNs to them. This is starting in autos (e.g. in South Africa, Turkey and India, 
countries with large markets and long import-substituting experience), though the scales are 
small compared to LAC. By contrast, there are few signs of major new electronics GPN sites 
in other regions. This may reflect the cumulative capability and agglomeration advantages of 
incumbents; it may also show that other regions cannot meet the current capability needs of 
global electronics production (much the minimum entry levels today are much more stringent 
than  in  the 1960s and 1970s).If there  is another burst of fragmentation that reaches other 
regions, it will only benefit countries with advanced skills, established industrial capabilities 
and sophisticated infrastructure. The  prospects for  the rest of  the developing world, 
particularly  the  least-developed countries that look to FDI to drive industrial and export 
growth (and have renounced traditional tools of fostering capability development), are not 
promising. For development analysts who look for lessons in industrial and exports success 
from  EA, particularly the new Tigers that grew mainly by  attracting GPNs, it calls for a 
sombre reassessment of policies and prospects.  
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Annex tables 
Annex Table 1: Electronics and automotive exports by finished products and parts and components, 
developed and developing countries (1990 to 2000) 





Main Products        1990  2000  1990  2000  1990 - 2000 
Electronics 
World   11.1  12.9  100%  100%  1.5% 
Developed  9.5  9.3  85.6%  71.8%  -0.2% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  1.5  3.6  13.9%  27.8%  8.8% 
World   7.2  10.9  100%  100%  4.3% 




Developing  1.9  2.3  26.2%  21.5%  2.2% 
World  67.2  188.7  100%  100%  10.9% 
Developed  52.1  105.3  77.6%  55.8%  7.3% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  14.4  80.5  21.5%  42.7%  18.8% 
World  40.8  139.6  100%  100%  13.1% 






Developing  6.5  67.5  16.0%  48.4%  26.3% 
World  52.1  75.9  100%  100%  3.8% 
Developed  33.7  35.8  64.7%  47.2%  0.6% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  17.2  37.3  32.9%  49.2%  8.1% 
World  24.6  76.5  100%  100%  12.0% 







Developing  6.7  22.6  27.2%  29.6%  13.0% 
World  53.3  263.0  100%  100%  17.3% 
Developed  36.4  134.9  68.3%  51.3%  14.0% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  16.8  126.9  31.4%  48.2%  22.4% 
World  5.4  21.5  100%  100%  14.7% 
Developed  3.7  11.8  67.6%  54.9%  12.3% 






Developing  1.7  9.6  31.7%  44.5%  18.7% 
World  183.7  540.5  100%  100%  11.4% 
Developed  131.7  285.3  71.7%  52.8%  8.0% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  49.9  248.3  27.2%  45.9%  17.4% 
World  77.9  248.4  100%  100%  12.3% 




Developing  16.8  102.0  21.6%  41.1%  19.8% 
Automotive 
World  208.5  371.4  100%  100%  5.9% 
Developed  185.8  317.3  89.1%  85.4%  5.5% 
Automobiles  Finished 
products 
Developing  6.3  44.7  3.0%  12.0%  21.7% QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 22 
World  82.4  141.0  100%  100%  5.5% 
Developed  73.7  120.7  89.5%  85.6%  5.1% 
  Parts & 
Components 
Developing  6.2  16.3  7.5%  11.5%  10.1% 
World  16.5  33.2  100%  100%  7.3% 
Developed  14.6  26.6  88.3%  80.0%  6.2% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  1.9  3.0  11.3%  9.0%  4.9% 
World  13.2  24.8  100%  100%  6.5% 




Developing  0.8  3.5  6.4%  14.1%  15.3% 
World  225.0  404.6  100%  100%  6.1% 
Developed  200.3  343.9  89.0%  85.0%  5.6% 
Finished 
products 
Developing  8.1  47.7  3.6%  11.8%  19.4% 
World  95.6  165.8  100%  100%  5.7% 




Developing  7.1  19.8  7.4%  11.9%  10.8% 
 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database. 
Note: Exports by developed and developing countries do not add up to world exports because the latter include 
exports by transition economies, not shown separately.  
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Annex Table 2: Electronics and automotive exports by finished products and parts and 
components by East Asia and Latin America (1990 to 2000) 







   1990  2000  1990  2000  1990 - 2000 
Electronics 
EA  1.4  3.2  12.5%  25.2%  8.9%  Finished 
products 
LAC  0.1  0.3  1.2%  2.5%  8.7% 




LAC  0.0  0.2  0.6%  1.9%  16.2% 
EA  13.8  71.8  20.6%  38.0%  17.9%  Finished 
products 
LAC  0.5  8.5  0.8%  4.5%  32.7% 






LAC  0.2  4.9  0.4%  3.5%  40.2% 
EA  16.5  27.0  31.6%  35.6%  5.1%  Finished 
products 
LAC  0.4  9.3  0.7%  12.3%  38.2% 








LAC  0.1  3.3  0.3%  4.3%  44.0% 
EA  16.1  121.6  30.2%  46.2%  22.4%  Finished 
products 
LAC  0.1  3.1  0.2%  1.2%  42.8% 
EA  1.7  9.3  30.8%  43.3%  18.7% 
Thermionic, cold 





LAC  0.0  0.2  0.8%  1.1%  19.4% 
EA  47.8  223.6  26.0%  41.4%  16.7%  Finished 
products 
LAC  1.1  21.3  0.6%  3.9%  34.5% 




LAC  0.3  8.7  0.4%  3.5%  38.2% 
Automotive 
EA  2.2  15.4  1.1%  4.1%  21.3%  Finished 
products 
LAC  3.7  26.2  1.8%  7.1%  21.8% 




LAC  1.2  8.2  1.5%  5.8%  20.7% 
EA  0.1  0.4  0.5%  1.2%  16.0%  Finished 
products 
LAC  1.7  2.6  10.6%  7.7%  3.9% 




LAC  0.5  2.3  3.9%  9.1%  15.9% 
EA  2.3  15.8  1.0%  3.9%  21.1%  Finished 
products 
LAC  5.4  28.8  2.4%  7.1%  18.2% 




LAC  1.8  10.5  1.8%  6.3%  19.5% 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 24 
 
 
Annex Table 3: Electronics exports and imports by EA 9, by  destination and origin (US$ billion) 
 
 
Exports to  Imports from 






  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Finished  10.2  81.0  3.4  25.9  34.2 
116.
7 
    
47.8  
   
223.
6   13.2  93.3  11.5  33.2  8.5  43.3 




P&C  7.1  40.0  1.2  10.6  8.1  42.2 
    
16.4  
    
92.9   6.7  42.0  5.9  20.7  6.4  35.2 
   
19.1  
   
97.9  
EA9 
Total   17.3  121.1  4.6  36.5  42.2 
159.
0 
    
64.1  
   
316.
5   19.9  135.3  17.4  53.9  14.9  78.4 




Finished  2.1  7.0  0.0  2.6  0.3  14.7 
      
2.4  
    
24.3   1.2  12.8  0.4  5.4  7.5  1.1 
     
9.2  
   
19.2  
P&C  0.4  6.5  0.0  2.0  0.1  4.0 
      
0.5  
    
12.4   0.9  5.6  0.4  3.5  7.6  1.2 
     
8.9  
   
10.3  
China  
Total   2.6  13.4  0.0  4.6  0.3  18.7 
      
3.0  
    
36.7   2.1  18.3  0.8  8.9  15.1  2.3 
   
18.1  
   
29.5  
Finished  2.4  21.4  0.6  3.7  11.7  27.7 
    
14.7  
    
52.9   3.5  21.2  2.7  6.2  2.2  9.1 
     
8.4  
   
36.5  
P&C  1.5  8.5  0.2  1.3  2.1  8.4 
      
3.8  
    
18.1   2.3  8.6  0.9  2.8  1.1  4.2 
     
4.3  




Total   3.9  29.9  0.8  5.0  13.8  36.1 
    
18.5  
    
71.0   5.7  29.8  3.6  9.0  3.3  13.3 
   
12.7  
   
52.1  
Finished  0.2  1.0  0.1  0.1  1.7  1.4 
      
1.9  
      
2.5   4.8  21.8  2.4  5.0  1.3  4.0 
     
8.5  
   
30.8  
P&C  1.7  1.0  0.1  0.1  0.9  0.3 
      
2.6  
      
1.4   1.3  13.0  0.9  3.5  0.6  4.3 
     
2.8  




Total   1.9  2.0  0.1  0.2  2.5  1.8 
      
4.6  
      
4.0   6.1  34.7  3.3  8.5  1.9  8.3 
   
11.4  
   
51.5  
Finished  1.4  14.1  0.6  6.6  6.9  18.8 
      
8.9  
    
39.6   0.4  3.1  0.4  1.3  0.2  1.0 
     
1.0  
     
5.5  
P&C  1.0  4.3  0.2  1.7  2.8  9.5 
      
4.0  
    
15.6   0.7  2.6  0.6  1.5  1.0  3.5 
     
2.2  
     
7.7  
Taiwan 
Total   2.4  18.5  0.8  8.3  9.7  28.4 
    
12.9  
    
55.1   1.1  5.7  0.9  2.9  1.2  4.5 
     
3.2  
   
13.1  
Finished  2.0  13.8  1.5  4.6  8.3  19.2 
    
11.8  
    
37.6   0.9  9.0  2.5  4.6  1.7  10.3 
     
5.1  
   
23.9  
P&C  0.4  4.8  0.4  1.8  0.8  7.8 
      
1.6  
    
14.5   0.3  3.2  1.3  2.5  0.9  1.8 
     
2.5  
     
7.5  
Korea 
Total  2.4  18.6  1.9  6.4  9.1  27.0 
    
13.4  
    
52.0   1.1  12.2  3.8  7.1  2.6  12.1 
     
7.5  
   
31.4  
Finished  1.7  11.9  0.5  3.8  3.9  16.3 
      
6.1  
    
32.1   0.9  8.5  0.5  2.9  0.6  3.1 
     
2.1  
   
14.5  
P&C  1.1  7.2  0.2  1.7  0.5  7.6 
      
1.7  
    
16.5   0.8  4.7  0.9  3.2  1.8  9.1 
     
3.5  
   
17.0  
Malaysia 
Total  2.8  19.1  0.7  5.6  4.4  23.9 
      
7.8  
    
48.6   1.8  13.3  1.4  6.1  2.4  12.2 
     
5.6  
   
31.6  
Finished  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.5  0.0  2.4 
      
0.1  
      
4.4   0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1 
     
0.5  
     
0.4  
P&C  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.6 
      
0.0  
      
2.5   0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1 
     
0.2  
     
0.1  
Indonesia 
Total   0.0  2.9  0.0  1.0  0.1  3.0 
      
0.1  
      
6.9   0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2 
     
0.7  
     
0.5  
Finished  0.2  2.7  0.1  1.3  1.0  5.3 
      
1.3  
      
9.3   0.4  3.1  0.4  1.3  0.2  1.0 
     
1.0  
     
5.5  
P&C  0.9  4.3  0.2  0.9  0.9  3.0 
      
2.0  
      
8.3   0.7  2.6  0.6  1.5  1.0  3.5 
     
2.2  
     
7.7  
Thailand 
Total  1.1  7.1  0.3  2.2  1.9  8.3 
      
3.3  
    
17.6   1.1  5.7  0.9  2.9  1.2  4.5 
     
3.2  
   
13.1  
Finished  0.1  7.6  0.0  2.5  0.3  10.8 
      
0.5  
    
21.0   0.0  1.4  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.4 
     
0.1  
     
2.2  
P&C  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.6  0.0  1.0 
      
0.1  
      
3.6   0.1  2.5  0.2  2.2  0.4  4.6 
     
0.7  




Total  0.2  9.6  0.0  3.1  0.3  11.8 
      
0.5  
    
24.6   0.2  3.9  0.2  2.6  0.4  5.0 
     
0.8  
   
11.5  
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Note: P&C stands for parts and components. 
 
Annex Table 4: Electronics exports and imports by LAC 3 and Costa Rica, by  destination and origin ($ billion) 
Country 
of origin  Product  Exports to  Imports from 
     LAC-3  USA  ROW  World  LAC-3  USA  ROW  World 
      1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Finished  0.1  0.4  0.6  19.4  0.4  1.4  1.1  21.2  0.1  0.4  1.3  16.9  0.9  7.1  2.3  24.5 
P&C  0.0  0.1  0.2  5.9  0.1  1.0  0.3  7.0  0.0  0.1  0.8  5.1  0.9  4.6  1.7  9.8  LAC-3 
Total   0.1  0.5  0.7  25.3  0.6  2.4  1.4  28.2  0.1  0.5  2.1  22.0  1.8  11.6  4.0  34.2 
Finished  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.6  0.2  1.3 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.1  0.8  Argentina 
Total   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.5  0.2  1.1  0.3  2.1 
Finished  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.9  0.0  0.1  0.4  1.8  0.5  1.9  0.8  3.8 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.9  0.4  1.8  0.6  2.8  Brazil 
Total  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.3  0.0  0.1  0.6  2.7  0.8  3.8  1.4  6.6 
Finished  0.0  0.1  0.3  19.0  0.1  1.1  0.5  20.2  0.0  0.0  0.9  14.9  0.4  4.5  1.3  19.4 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.1  5.7  0.0  0.8  0.2  6.6  0.0  0.0  0.5  3.9  0.4  2.3  1.0  6.2  Mexico 
Total  0.0  0.1  0.4  24.8  0.2  1.9  0.6  26.8  0.0  0.0  1.4  18.8  0.8  6.8  2.2  25.6 
Finished  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.8 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.7  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  Costa Rica 
Total  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.7  0.0  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.9 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database. 
Note: P&C stands for parts and components. 
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Annex Table 5: Automotive exports and imports by East Asia 9, by  destination and origin (US$ billion) 
Exports to  Imports from 







1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Finished  0.2  1.1  0.0  0.0  2.1  14.6  2.3  15.8  0.2  0.9  4.0  5.1  3.4  4.0  7.6  9.9 
P&C  3.4  1.7  0.3  1.0  1.3  4.7  4.9  7.4  2.9  1.1  4.5  6.2  2.0  4.2  9.4  11.5  EA9 
Total   3.6  2.8  0.3  1.0  3.3  19.3  7.2  23.1  3.0  2.0  8.5  11.2  5.4  8.1  17.0  21.4 
Finished  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.8  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.5 
P&C  3.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  1.0  3.5  1.4  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.9  0.6  1.6  1.0  2.7  China  
Total   3.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  1.2  3.5  1.6  0.2  0.3  0.6  1.7  1.1  2.2  1.9  4.2 
Finished  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.4  1.0  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.6 
P&C  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.0  Singapore 
Total   0.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.8  0.1  0.3  0.7  1.3  0.8  1.1  1.6  2.7 
Finished  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0.8  0.2  0.8  0.7  1.7 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.7 
Hong 
Kong 
Total   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.6  1.1  0.4  1.1  1.1  2.4 
Finished  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.3  1.4  0.9  1.7  1.4 
P&C  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.6  1.2  0.7  1.8  0.0  0.1  0.7  1.2  0.2  0.2  0.9  1.4  Taiwan 
Total   0.1  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.6  1.3  0.8  2.0  0.1  0.2  1.0  1.5  1.6  1.1  2.6  2.8 
Finished  0.1  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.9  12.5  2.0  13.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.5 
P&C  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.2  1.6  0.3  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.2  0.7  0.7  1.5  Korea 
Total   0.1  0.9  0.1  0.2  2.1  14.1  2.2  15.2  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.8  0.4  1.1  1.0  1.9 
Finished  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.2  0.2  1.1  1.4 
P&C  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  Malaysia 
Total   0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.1  1.0  1.4  0.3  0.3  1.3  1.8 
Finished  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.6  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.8  0.6 
P&C  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.7  1.0  0.1  0.2  0.8  1.4  Indonesia 
Total   0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.4  1.2  1.2  0.3  0.5  1.6  2.0 
Finished  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  0.1  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.3  0.2  0.2  1.0  0.5 
P&C  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.2  1.6  1.4  0.2  0.3  1.7  1.8  Thailand 
Total   0.0  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.9  0.1  2.4  0.0  0.2  2.3  1.7  0.4  0.5  2.7  2.4 
Finished  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.7 
P&C  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3 
Philippine
s 
Total   0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.6  0.0  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.6  1.0 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database. 
Note: P&C stands for parts and components. 
 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 27 
 
Annex Table 6: Automotive exports and imports by LAC-3, by destination and origin (US$ billion) 
Exports to   Imports from 







1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Finished  0.1  2.9  4.0  21.0  1.3  4.3  5.4  28.2  0.0  2.9  0.4  6.5  0.1  3.4  0.6  12.8 
P&C  0.3  1.1  0.8  7.5  0.5  1.6  1.6  10.1  0.2  1.0  2.3  10.9  1.4  5.2  3.9  17.0  LAC3 
Total   0.3  4.0  4.9  28.5  1.8  5.9  7.0  38.4  0.2  3.9  2.7  17.4  1.5  8.6  4.5  29.8 
Finished  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.0  1.5 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.7  0.2  1.2 
Argenti
na 
Total   0.1  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.9  0.1  1.3  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.3  0.2  2.7 
Finished  0.0  1.5  0.4  0.3  0.9  1.2  1.4  3.0  0.0  1.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.0  0.1  2.4 
P&C  0.2  0.7  0.4  0.7  0.4  0.9  1.0  2.3  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.4  1.5  0.5  2.2  Brazil 
Total   0.2  2.2  0.8  1.1  1.3  2.1  2.4  5.3  0.1  1.7  0.1  0.4  0.4  2.4  0.6  4.5 
Finished  0.0  0.1  3.6  20.7  0.3  3.0  4.0  23.7  0.0  0.7  0.4  6.4  0.0  1.9  0.4  9.0 
P&C  0.0  0.0  0.4  6.7  0.1  0.5  0.5  7.2  2.0  9.2  2.2  10.4  2.1  9.6  6.3  29.2  Mexico 
Total   0.0  0.1  4.0  27.3  0.4  3.4  4.4  30.9  2.4  13.8  2.6  16.8  2.4  14.5  7.4  45.1 
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database. 
Note: P&C stands for parts and components. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS115  Page 28 
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